9 In this new “conventional” operational environment, JaN was forced to modify their SVBIEDs to use them efficiently. 8Ī JaN covert SVBIED based on a flatbed truck used in early December 2012.Īs the opposition started capturing and controlling territory in 2013, they gradually began confronting the Syrian Army in a more conventional manner, employing tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces recently added to their arsenal as a result of their territorial expansion. 7 The use of this type of SVBIED was logical for a group that lacked territorial control, and allowed JaN to both terrorize government-controlled areas and knock out isolated checkpoints and outposts by approaching their desired targets unnoticed before detonating large quantities of explosives. 6 Covert SVBIEDs are the most commonly used type of SVBIED and they have been employed in many parts of the world by a multitude of non-state actors, both past and present. 5 The SVBIEDs used in this first phase were “covert” in nature, in that they utilized civilian vehicles with unmodified exteriors or seized army vehicles, in an attempt to avoid detection and blend in with their operational surroundings. 4 Beginning in late 2011, the group initiated a campaign of SVBIED attacks against both high-profile state targets in major urban centers and checkpoints and outposts of the Syrian Army in the countryside. When HTS first emerged as a serious actor in Syria in 2012, it operated under the name of Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN). 3 The group’s use of SVBIEDs can be roughly divided into three phases, each reflecting specific operational environments. However, its use of this powerful weapon has changed dramatically over time and evolved in a continuous attempt to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground.
2 Throughout the conflict, HTS has remained the most prolific user of SVBIEDs among all the disparate opposition factions. The use of SVBIEDs has been a cornerstone of the wider Syrian opposition’s military strategy since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Sometimes referred to as “the poor man’s air force,” 1 it constitutes the single most powerful weapon at the disposal of most non-state actors.
One of the only weapons with the ability to bridge the gap in military capabilities between non-state and state actors is the suicide car bomb. While these methods of attack may wear down regular armed forces over time, they are employed from a position of inferior military strength. To overcome these challenges, nascent insurgencies consistently opt for guerrilla warfare through ambushes, sabotage, hit-and-run attacks, and raids, all of which normally allow smaller units to avoid confronting the might of the state head on.
This disparity of arms, manpower, and technology means that non-state actors are generally at a disadvantage when fighting against the state. This is particularly true when it comes to civil wars, where numerically inferior breakaway factions are pitted against the state and all that it encompasses: a standing army, artillery, tanks, and most crucially, an air force. In armed conflicts, the balance of power is often skewed one way. It will also examine HTS’s evolving SVBIED design, paying particular attention to technical innovations such as environment-specific paint schemes, drone support teams, tablets with target coordinates, and live camera feeds, as well as upgraded main charges. In an attempt to further understand this strategy and how it has evolved over time, this case study seeks to compare and contrast HTS’s past and current use of SVBIEDs, with a heavy focus on the latter. Formally known as suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), these weapons have been a cornerstone of the group’s - and by extension, the entire opposition’s - military strategy since early stages of the war, when rebel forces began capturing and holding territory. As the chief rebel group in control of Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has employed dozens of suicide car bombs as part of its continued defense of the area. Since May 2019, a series of Syrian loyalist offensives backed by the Russian air force has gradually encroached upon the country’s northwestern Idlib Province, home to the last major pocket of opposition-held territory.
0 kommentar(er)
